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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:
:

Case No. 20030283-CA

STEVEN MANCHESTER
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of forgery, a third
degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-501, and one count of theft, a class
A misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-404. The Defendant was found
guilty by a jury on January 8, 2003 and was sentenced on March 6, 2003. This
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(e)(2002).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

WERE THE DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE ALLOWED
THE JURORS TO QUESTION THE STATE'S
WITNESSES?

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a matter of
law whether the Defendant's due process rights were violated when the jurors
were allowed to ask questions of the State's witnesses.

"[Constitutional

arguments regarding . . . due process present questions of law that we review
for correctness."

State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App. 381 (Utah Ct. App.

2003)(citations and quotations omitted).

This Court should apply "close

judicial scrutiny and review [] the trial court's decision for correctness." State
v. Madsen, 57 P.3d 1134, 1135, (Utah Ct. App. 2002)(brackets in original).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Fifth Amendment
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of lav/; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
Sixth Amendment
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.
7

Fourteenth Amendment
Section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article 1, Section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
U.C.A. §76-6-404 Theft - Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
U.C.A. §76-6-501 Forgery- "Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such
altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or
utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution,
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be
the act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to
have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than
was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original
existed.
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including
3

forms such as:
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money,
and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification;
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a
government or any agency; or
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in
or claim against any person or enterprise.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(e). Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by information with forgery, a third degree
felony, and theft, a third degree felony. (R. 001). An amended information
was filed that corrected the date of the offense. (R. 058). The Defendant pled
not guilty and a jury trial was held on January 8, 2003 in front of the Honorable
Michael D. Lyon. The Defendant was convicted on both counts. (R. 153/243).
The conviction for count two of the information, theft was reduced by the trial
judge to a class A misdemeanor due to inadequacies with one of the documents
the State used to show that the Defendant had prior convictions for theft. (R.
152/3-4). On March 6, 2003, the Defendant was sentenced to serve 0-5 years
at the Utah State Prison for the forgery and one year for the theft conviction.
(R. 128, R. 152/9). The final commitment and order was signed on March 10,
2003. (R. 128). On March 28, 2003, the Defendant filed a pro se notice of
4

appeal. (R. 130). The Weber County Public Defender's Office was appointed
to represent the Defendant on appeal and a second notice of appeal was filed on
March 31, 2003. (R. 133).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Defendant was convicted of forgery and theft for an incident that
occurred on April 23, 2002, in Weber County. In April of 2002, the Defendant
was living with his friend Tom Moore. The Defendant apparently found a loan
company in Canada that would lend Tom Moore ten thousand dollars
($10,000). (R. 153/67-68). They had to send the company eight hundred and
twenty-five dollars ($825) in order to obtain the loan. (R. 153/68).
On April 23, 2002, the Defendant and Tom Moore went to the Western
Union located inside the Smith's Food King located at 12 Street and Harrison
Boulevard in Ogden, Utah. (R. 153/69).
paperwork at the Western Union. Id.

The Defendant filled out the

Their intent was to wire the eight

hundred and twenty-five dollars to the loan company in Canada.
Later that day, the Defendant went back in to the Western Union with
the receipt and asked to have the wire cancelled and the money refunded. (R.
153/125-26).

The Defendant had the receipt and the answer to a "test

question" that allows Western Union to refund money without identification.
(R. 153/129-30).

The Defendant filled out the necessary paper work and
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signed Tom Moore's name. (R. 153/131-32). He received the eight hundred
and twenty-five dollars. Id. The Defendant moved out of Tom Moore's house
on that same day. (R. 153/76).
Tom Moore eventually discovered that the money hadn't been wired to
the company in Canada. He contacted a Rose Powers who worked for the
company. (R. 153/78). Ms. Powers informed Tom Moore that when she went
to Western Union in Canada to get the money it wasn't there. (R. 153/79). He
checked with Western Union and they informed him that they had issued a
refund check the same day he had sent the money. Id. The check had been
issued in his (Tom Moore's) name. (R. 153/79). Tom Moore was surprised
that a refund check had been issued. He looked around his house and couldn't
find the receipt from Western Union. (R. 153/82). At some point Tom Moore
talked to the Defendant on the phone and the Defendant told him that he had
taken the money and he would pay him back. (R. 153/83). The Defendant
didn't pay Tom back so he reported it to the police. (R. 153/84).
During the trial, the trial court allowed the jurors to ask questions of the
witnesses. (R. 153/133). The jury submitted written questions of specific
witnesses to the trial judge. (Id., R. 153/191). The Defendant's trial attorney
objected to the jury being allowed to ask questions of the witness. Id. The trial

judge overruled the Defendant's objection. In making his ruling, Judge Ly
stated,
This is my ruling: First of all, I think there is a very strong
movement afoot in this country to allow jurors to ask questions.
And if it were my choice, that would be Standard Operating
Procedure in the courtroom. And I understand that there are some
lawyers that are objecting to it, and obviously, you do.
At this point in my career, until I feel stronger, I'm probably going
to defer to the lawyers. And if the lawyers, both sides, agree that
juries may ask questions, then I'm in favor of that. If one side
objects, until I have a chance to think it through a little better, I'm
probably going to say, okay, there's an objection, we won't permit
them - that is invite them to ask questions.
Having said that, however, I have a responsibility to make sure
that this case on both sides is fairly tried. And if an issue is
ambiguous, so that the fact finder is not certain about facts,
whether they appear particularly relevant to us or not, but at least
allow them to understand the case better, then I'm constrained to
allow them to ask the question and to answer it.
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And while I won't invite them to ask questions, if they send me a
note on their own, wanting something to be answered, then I'm
going to allow them to do it. And we can do it one of two ways.
We can send the note back in to them, which I only like doing
after they're deliberating, or we put them back on the stand, a
witness, and you will have in front of you both of these questions.
And all I ask, so that we don't offer a lot of cumulative evidence
and replow [sic] the ground again, that we very specifically, very
pointedly ask in effect the jury's question and elicit that evidence.
(R. 153/135-36). There were two separate incidents during the trial where after
a witness finished testifying the jurors submitted written questions and the
witnesses were put back on the stand to answer the juror's questions.
(R.153/139-46, R. 153/191-94). The prosecutor was then allowed to ask
follow up questions to the jurors' original question and the Defendant's
attorney was allowed to ask additional cross-examination questions. Id.
Following jury deliberations, the Defendant was convicted of both the
forgery and the theft. (R. 153/243).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Each party in a trial has a separate and distinct role. The prosecutor has
the burden of proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt. It's the jury's role
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to listen to the evidence, weigh the evidence and then decide whether the State
has met its burden and proved the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant enjoys a number of rights. Due process presumes the defendant
to be innocent until the prosecutor proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The presumption of innocence is a fundamental principle of our criminal
justice system. It is the prosecutor's burden to overcome that presumption.
The prosecutor overcomes the presumption of innocence.
The Defendant's due process rights were violated when the jurors were
allowed to ask questions of the State's witnesses. The jurors' questions
assisted the prosecutor in overcoming the presumption of innocence.
When jurors are allowed to ask questions of the State's witnesses they
step outside of their role as fact finders and become advocates. Allowing
jurors to question the State's witnesses also helps the prosecutor to prove her
case.
The Defendant's due process rights were violated during the trial when
the jurors questioned the State's witnesses. For these reasons his convictions
should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
THE DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE
VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE ALLOWED THE
JURORS TO ASK THE WITNESSES QUESTIONS.

9

During the trial the jurors were allowed to ask questions of the State's
witnesses.

This is a practice that should not be allowed as it violates a

defendant's due process rights. Under the due process clause of both the state
and federal constitutions, a criminal defendant is presumed innocent until the
State has proven him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. "[A]s both a state and
federal constitutional matter, we conclude that due process requires that the
prosecution prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable
doubt." State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191,195 (Utah 1999). See also, Utah Const.
Art. I, § 7; U.S. Const. Amend. V, XIV; State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136,
1138 (Utah 1992)("Both the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution require that the burden of proving all elements of a crime is on the
prosecution.")
The prosecution proves the elements of crime through examining
witnesses. If the prosecutor does not elicit enough evidence to prove every
element of an offense from his or her witnesses then there is reasonable doubt
and a jury should acquit a defendant.. Allowing jurors to ask questions of the
State's witnesses violates due process because it allows them to elicit evidence
and fill in any holes that are in the State's case. It therefore absolves the
prosecutor of its burden and the juror becomes the party who is producing
evidence. If the State does not elicit enough testimony to satisfy a juror's mind
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chat the elements of a crime have been proven, the juror can close the gaps in
the State's case by asking witnesses questions until his or her mind is satisfied
that a defendant is guilty. This is an obvious due process violation. In State v.
Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court stated that
"[i]t is also to be kept in mind that the burden of proving the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt is always upon the state: both initially and
ultimately."
In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the defendant
successfully argued that his due process rights under the Utah Constitution
were violated when the State introduced eyewitness evidence. Although the
Supreme Court's due process analysis focused on eyewitness identification, the
due process principles have a broader application and serve as a guide in the
case at bar.
The Utah Supreme Court specifically addressed the role of the
prosecutor, judge and jury. In its analysis, the Court stated that,
[o]f central importance is the burden that rests on the prosecution
and the distinction between the role of the judge, as the arbiter of
the constitutional admissibility of an identification, and the role of
the jury, as the ultimate finder of fact. A failure to keep this
burden and this distinction in mind can fatally flaw any conviction
obtained through the admissibility of an eyewitness identification.
Id. at 778. It is important to note that the prosecutor, judge and jury all have
distinct roles. Allowing jurors to play the role of the prosecutor by examining
11

witnesses diminishes the prosecutor's burden. "A failure to keep this burden
and this distinction in mind can fatally flaw any conviction . . ." Id.
As it relates to eyewitness identification, the Court indicated that the
prosecution has the burden of demonstrating the admissibility of proffered
evidence.

The trial judge has to determine the evidence's constitutional

admissibility.

If the court finds the evidence admissible, it may then be

presented to the jury. The jury then has to decide factual issues and determine
whether to believe the admitted evidence. Id. In determining admissibility, the
trial court will be required to make some factual determinations. The jury will
also have to make some of the same factual determinations when it considers
the evidence. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court stated that "[pjotential for role confusion and
for erosion of constitutional guarantees inheres in this overlap of responsibility
of judge and jury to determine the same issue." Id. Although the Court was
addressing the responsibilities of judges and juries, the same analysis should be
made as it concerns the role of prosecutors and juries. If the roles of prosecutor
and juror overlap as they do when jurors are allowed to ask questions of the
witnesses there is an erosion of constitutional guarantees.
The Defendant is presumed innocent until the prosecutor proves him
guilty of every element of each offense.
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The jury's role is "to weigh the

evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Mead, 27
P.3d 1115, 1132 (Utah 2001)(citations and quotations omitted). When jurors
ask questions they are no longer listening to the evidence, deciding what
weight should be given to the evidence and whether or not the prosecutor has
met his or her burden. Instead, they are assisting the prosecutor in eliciting and
creating the evidence. This role confusion violates a defendant's due process
rights.
The case at bar is a good example of jurors being allowed to step outside
their role and into the role of the prosecutor. The jurors were allowed to ask
question of the victim, and the detective who investigated the case. After both
the prosecutor and the Defendant's attorney were done examining Tom Moore
he was put back on the stand to answer the jurors questions. The questions
were submitted to the trial judge in written form. (R. 153/133). However, it
was the prosecutor who actually asked Tom Moore the juror's questions.
Having the prosecutor ask the jurors questions further blurred the roles
between the prosecutor and jury and it unconstitutionally connected the
prosecutor with the jury.
The first question one of the jurors asked was "Does the loan officer
exist in Canada?" (R. 153/140). The prosecutor was able to not only ask the
witness that question, but also a number of follow up questions. The second
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question that one of the jurors wrote down was actually asked a little different
by the prosecutor. See, (R. 153/133). The prosecutor asked the question as
follows, "I'm confused, why would you agree to go in the first place/' the
prosecutor injected "I'm assuming to the Western Union," and then finished
the question "but you still had to borrow money?" (R. 153/143). As soon as
the prosecutor finished reading the jurors question she stated "And so maybe
we need to back up. When - what was the reason that you wanted to get this
loan?" Id. The prosecutor then asked an additional ten questions. (R. 153/143145).
This sequence of events offends due process for a couple of reasons.
First, the trial judge had the prosecutor ask the jurors questions. Having the
prosecutor read the jurors' questions impermissibly connects the prosecutor
and the jury. Second, the questions allowed the prosecutor to get inside the
minds of the jurors. She was aware of the jurors concerns and was able to ask
additional questions to eliminate their potential doubts.
The same thing happened after Detective Reaves testified.

The

prosecutor said "Detective Reaves, there was a question that came in from the
jury that indicates, Tf a forgery was involved, why didn't Detective Reaves . ..
question the Western Union signature?" (R. 153/191).

Before Detective

Reaves could answer, the prosecutor said, "So why didn't you question the
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defendant about the signature on the Western Union form?" Id. The prosecutor
proceeded to ask her lead detective several additional questions in an attempt to
resolve the juror's obvious concern. (R. 153/191-94).
In State v. Madsen, 57 P.3d 1134 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), the defendant
argued that his constitutional rights to a fair trial and the presumption of
innocence were violated when there were two uniformed guards in the
courtroom and by allowing the Defendant to be shackled. He argued that "the
trial created an inherently prejudicial situation that violated his right to a fair
trial." Id. at 1136. This Court quoted the following language from State v.
Daniels, 40 P.3d 611 (Utah 2002),
The right to a fair trial is a fundamental constitutional right
secured by the due process and equal protection guarantees of the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Central to this right 'is the
principle that one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or
innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence
introduced at trial, and not on grounds of. . . other circumstances
not adduced as proof at trial.' The presumption of innocence is a
component of this guarantee of the right to a fair trial and has
become a basic element of our criminal justice system. Even
though the trial judge has broad latitude to control and manage the
proceedings to preserve the integrity of the trial process, when a
courtroom action or arrangement is challenged as inherently
prejudicial, we consider whether the practice presents an
unacceptable risk of bringing into play impermissible factors that
might erode the presumption of innocence. If the challenged
practice is not inherently prejudicial, the judgment of the trial
court will be affirmed. If the practice is inherently prejudicial, we
must then consider whether the prejudicial practice is outweighed
by any competing essential state interests.M at 1136.
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Under the analysis, this Court must determine whether allowing the
jurors to ask questions of the State's witnesses was "inherently prejudicial,
presenting an unacceptable risk of introducing impermissible factors that
impinge upon the presumption of innocence." Id. As has already been outlined
above, the Defendant is presumed innocent until the State proves his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.

It is the State's burden to overcome the

presumption of innocence. Allowing the jurors to ask questions helps the State
overcome its burden in two ways. First, it allows the jurors to close gaps in the
evidence and resolve their own concerns with the evidence.

Second, as

happened here, the prosecutor is allowed to get inside the mind of the jurors
and understand what concerns or doubts they are having. The prosecutor was
then allowed to ask follow up questions in an attempt to overcome the jurors'
confusions or doubts.
Since the courtroom action is "inherently prejudicial" this Court must
determine if the prejudicial practice is "outweighed by any competing state
interests." Id. There is no state interest that allows jurors to infringe on a
criminal defendant's presumption of innocence. Where there is reasonable
doubt as to whether the error in the trial court was prejudicial, the doubt should
be resolved in favor of the defendant. In State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah
1997), the Utah Supreme Court stated that,
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[Consistent with the nature of criminal proceedings and the
protections accorded those accused of crime under our law,
including the presumption of innocence and the burden of the state
to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we
believe that, on appeal, when there is a reasonable doubt as to
whether the error below was prejudicial, that doubt should be
resolved in favor of the defendant. This is especially true where
the error involved is one, which transgresses against the exercise
of a constitutional right. Id. at 1116.
Historically, jurors in Utah have been allowed to ask questions of
witnesses. This issue was first addressed in Utah in State v. Anderson, 158
P.2d 127, 108 Utah 130 (Utah 1945). In Anderson, the trial court asked the
jury if it would like to ask questions of the witnesses. Two of the jurors
accepted the invitation. Id. at 133. The Utah Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
fact that the trial court granted the jurors permission to ask questions of
witnesses without any special request from them for this privilege does not, in
our opinion, in and of itself constitute error. The determining factors as to
whether error has been committed is the type of questions asked and allowed to
be answered." Id.

The Court held that "[i]f the questions asked are not

germane to the issues involved or are such as would be clearly improper and
therefore prejudicial to the rights of the defendants to a fair and impartial trial,
the court's allowing them to be answered would be error." Id.
The Court examined the jurors' questions and determined that the
questions "might properly have been solicited on the direct examination of the
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witness and were such as would clarify material points in the testimony. The
court, therefore, did not err in permitting these questions to be answered." Id. at
134. The Court also made it clear that it does not wish it to be understood that
it approves the practice of a trial court inviting jurors to ask questions. This
privilege should only be granted when in the sound discretion of the court it
appears that it will aid a juror in understanding some material issue involved in
the case and . . . when some juror has indicated that he wishes such a point
clarified. Id.
In State v. Martinez, 326 P.2d 102, 7 Utah 2d 387 (1958), the trial court
invited and encouraged the jurors to ask the witnesses questions. After the jury
retired to deliberate, the trial court allowed them to question a witness who had
not been called by either the prosecution or the defense. It resulted in the jury
asking this witness more than fifty questions. Id. at 389. The Court held that
the trial court exceeded its discretion under these circumstances. "[W]e believe
and hold that not only prejudice was engendered but that the trial court
exceeded the bounds of discretion which circumscribe him in such cases." Id.
As recently as 1989, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[w]hile not
encouraged, it is within the trial court's discretion to allow jurors to ask
questions in court." State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1144-45 (Utah 1989).
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The Defendant respectfully requests this Court to overrule prior case law
and hold that it violates a defendant's due process rights to a fair trial to allow
jurors to ask questions of the State's witnesses over the objection of the
Defendant. In State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme
Court stated that "[tjhose asking us to overturn prior precedent have a
substantial burden of persuasion."

Id. at 398. Before an appellate court

overrules prior cases it must be "clearly convinced that the rule was originally
erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more
good than harm will come by departing from precedent." Id. at 399.
The reason prior case law should be overruled is because as it stands, the
rule allowing jurors to ask questions violates a defendant's due process rights.
Specifically, it infringes upon the presumption of innocence. The prosecutor
alone bears the burden of proving the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt, thus overcoming the presumption of innocence. Allowing the jurors to
ask questions can bridge the gaps in the evidence and it assists the jury in
overcoming their doubts. In essence, the prosecutor receives assistance from
the jury as it helps develop the evidence. Since the jury helped the prosecutor
overcome her burden of proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt, the
Defendant's constitutional rights were violated and his conviction should be
reversed.
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CONCLUSION
The Defendant's due process rights were violated when the trial court
permitted the jurors to ask questions of the State's witnesses.

It is the

prosecutor's burden to overcome the presumption of innocence. Allowing the
jurors to question the witnesses through the prosecutor infringes on this
presumption. The roles between the prosecutor and the jurors was blurred to
the point that the Defendant's constitutional rights to due process were
violated. For this reason, the Defendant respectfully requests this court to
reverse his conviction.
DATED this ]f_ day of December, 2003.
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
APP SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 021902180 FS

STEVEN JAY MANCHESTER,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

MICHAEL D. LYON
March 6, 2 003

PRESENT
Clerk:
maureem
Prosecutor: BRENDA BEATON
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARTIN GRAVIS
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 29, 1972
Video
Tape Number:
L03/06/03

Tape Count: 2:11

CHARGES
1. FORGERY - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 01/08/2003 Guilty
2. THEFT (amended) - Class A Misdemeanor
- Disposition: 01/08/2003 Guilty
HEARING
The court rules that it does not accept the enhancement regarding
the conviction in California, and reduces defendant's conviction on
Count 2 to MA Theft.

Page 1
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Case No: 021902180
Date:
Mar 06, 2003
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Defendant's sentence on count 2 shall run concurrently with his
sentence on count 1.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The court recommends restitution of $892.00, to be determined by
the Board of Pardons.

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a Class A Misdemeanor,
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 1 year(s)
Dated this

* ^ day of

KllX.

' 2°L

J* MICHAEL D. LYON
District Court Judge
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ADDENDUM B

only coming in for the sole purpose of identifying what
it was that he had done.
Obviously, Rose Powers is not going to be here
to actually come and testify.

She lives in Canada

currently, so -- and I think it would be appropriate
just to clarify for the jury as far as the State's aware
and the defendant's aware that she actually exists.
MR. GRAVIS:

I don't want

whether she actually exists anyway.

(Inaudible)

testify

Somebody purporting

to be Rose Powers, you can talk to somebody purporting
to be but they cannot testify she exists, or the loan
company exists.
THE COURT:

This is my ruling:

First of all,

I think there is a very strong movement afoot in this
country to allow jurors to ask questions.

And if it

were my choice, that would be SOP in the courtroom.

And

I understand that there are some lawyers that are
objecting to it, and obviously, you do.
At this point in my career, until I feel
stronger, I'm probably going to defer to the lawyers.
And if the lawyers, both sides, agree that juries may
ask questions, then I'm in favor of that.

If one side

objects, until I have a chance to think it through a
little better, I'm probably going to say, okay, there's
an objection, we won't permit them -- that is invite
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them to ask questions.
Having said that, however, I have a
responsibility to make sure that this case on both sides
is fairly tried.

And if an issue is ambiguous, so that

the fact finder is not certain about facts, whether they
appear particularly relevant to us or not, but at least
allow them to understand the case better, then

I'm

constrained to allow them to ask the question and to
answer it.
And while I won't invite them to ask
questions, if they send me a note on their own, wanting
something to be answered, then I'm going to allow them
to do it.

And we can do it one of two ways.

We can

send the note back in to them, which I only like doing
after they're deliberating, or we put them back on the
stand, a witness, and you will have in front of you both
of these questions.

And all I ask, so that we don't

offer a lot of cumulative evidence and replow the ground
again, that we very specifically, very pointedly ask in
effect the jury's question and elicit that evidence.
I'm going to then give you a chance, Mr.
Gravis, to cross examine, so that at least there's been
direct examination, cross examination, if necessary
redirect examination and recross examination on any
issue that the jury has asked.

And then I'll just let
page 136

ADDENDUM C

All right f

ladies and gentlemen, we're going

to be in recess until a quarter to 2:00.

If you'd be

back in your seats at that time, we'd appreciate it,
ready to go.

Thanks.

(Lunch recess taken.)
(Whereupon, an in-chambers conference was
held.)
THE COURT:

Okay.

For the record,

received two written questions from the jury.
question is:

Does the loan exist in Canada?

I've
One
I propose

that we tell the jury that Tom Moore testified that he
spoke with Rose Powers, the loan officer in Canada.
And the second question is not very artfully
worded, but it's -- this is it verbatim:
if it's relevant, but Mr. Tom —

"I don't know

I'm confused why he

would agree to go in the first place and still have to
borrow money."
For the record, Mr. Gravis objects to both of
these questions, or the Court giving answers to either
of these questions, because the evidence has already
been presented.
MR. GRAVIS:

There was a couple of other

grounds.
THE COURT:
MR. GRAVIS:

Go ahead, I won't -First off, on the

(Inaudible),
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ADDENDUM D

All right, ladies and gentlemen, we're going
to be in recess until a quarter to 2:00.

If you'd be

back in your seats at that time, we'd appreciate it,
ready to go.

Thanks.

(Lunch recess taken.)
(Whereupon, an in-chambers conference was
held.)
THE COURT:

Okay.

For the record,

received two written questions from the jury.
question is:

Does the loan exist in Canada?

I've
One
I propose

that we tell the jury that Tom Moore testified that he
spoke with Rose Powers, the loan officer in Canada.
And the second question is not very artfully
worded, but it's —

this is it verbatim:

"I don't know

if it's relevant, but Mr. Tom -- I'm confused why he
would agree to go in the first place and still have to
borrow money."
For the record, Mr. Gravis objects to both of
these questions, or the Court giving answers to either
of these questions, because the evidence has already
been presented.
MR. GRAVIS:

There was a couple of other

grounds.
THE COURT:
MR. GRAVIS:

Go ahead, I won't -First off, on the

(Inaudible),
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Q.

O^ay.
One of the questions that we received was:

"Does the loan officer exist in Canada?"
Did you actually speak to somebody who worked
for the company in Canada?
A.

Yes, Rose Powers.

Q.

Okay.
MR. GRAVIS:

And I -- may I voir dire the

witness ?
THE COURT:

You may.

MS. BEATON:

If I could just have an

opportunity to develop

—

MR. GRAVIS:

I'm going to object unless he has

personal knowledge of these people
MS. BEATON:

(Inaudible).

Well, I think it's a foundational

issue and I'd ask that I be allowed to
THE COURT:

(Inaudible).

I'll let you lay your

foundation

and then you can voir dire the witness.
Q.

BY MS. BEATON:

What number did you use to

call this company?
A.

It was an 800 number.

I don't know the number

offhand, off of memory.
Q.

Where did you get the number?

A.

Out of a business magazine.

Q,

What's the name of the company?
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A.
company-

It was some kind of consult -- it was a loan
I -- it's been so long, I couldn f t really tell

you what it was.
Q.

When you called the company, did you ask to

speak with Rose Powers?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And did a female answer the phone there?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Have you ever actually met Rose Powers?

A.

No, I haven't.

Q.

Was there ever any discussion that that

person, Rose Powers, would come to Utah?
A.

No.

Q.

Have you ever, yourself, met her in Canada?

A.

No.

Q.

Okay.
And that was the conversation that you had --

a conversation with somebody who identified

themselves

as Rose Powers?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Okay.
Now, in talking to this person, did she seem

to be familiar with the application process that you had
already
A.

discussed?
Yes.

She told me that she had gone to Western
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Union and the money was not there.
Q.

Okay.
In talking with her, did you originally talk

to her at any point in time prior to discovering that
there was possibly a problem with this transaction,
after you actually went over to the Western Union
office?
A.

No, I hadn't.

Q.

Okay.
And I think what you indicated earlier is that

you believed that the defendant had already talked to
Rose Powers?
A.

Yeah, before I wired the money.

Q.

Okay.
And in speaking with the defendant, did he

identify the loan officer or the person that he was
dealing with by the name of Rose Powers?
A.

Yes, he did.

Q.

Okay.
And is that the way that you knew who to call

at the company?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Because at the time that you made your call,

did you have any of the paperwork then from the wire
transfer?
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A.

N n ; I don't believe I did.
MS. BEATON:

No.

All right, I think that's the one

question.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Now before you move to the

next one, Mr. Gravis, did you want to further voir dire
the witness?
MR. GRAVIS:
THE COURT:
Q.

No, not right now.
Okay.

BY MS. BEATON:

it indicates:

And then the next question is,

fT f

I m confused, why would you agree to go

in the first place," I'm assuming to the Western Union,
"but you still had to borrow money?"
And so maybe we need to back up.

When -- what

was the reason that you wanted to get this loan?
A.

For debt consolidation.

Q.

And how much of a loan did you expect to get?

A.

$10,000.

Q.

Were you going to secure that loan with any

type of property or a home or anything of that nature?
A.

It was with $825 down.

Q.

Okay.
What is the reason, then, that you decided

that you would go out and borrow the original loan
origination fee of $825 in order to get this loan?
A.

So I could turn around —

I wanted to
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refinance my house while the interest rates were lower.
Q.

Okay.

A.

And, you know, take care of some bills I had.

Q.

Did you plan on using the $10,000 loan also to

pay off the person who gave the initial money to you in
order to get this loan?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

If you originally did not have the $825 that

you needed in order to get this loan, what's the reason
that you decided that it would be a good idea to borrow
it from somebody else?
A.

Well, she was staying at my house and, you

know, I was just helping her out, too, kind of like I
was him.

And so she had some money and she says, "Well,

if you can do that, then we can get the lower payment on
the house going," because my mortgage payment was
killing me at the time.
Q.

How much was your mortgage payment at the

A.

It was 750 and then it was going to balloon to

time?

850.

It was on a weird kind of a rate and with the

mortgage rates dropping at that time, you know, I
figured well, if I refinance, I can drop my monthly
payment substantious -- you know, and save some money.
Q.

So this woman who decided to loan you the
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money, she thought it would be helpful for herself as
well ?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Was this person then kicking in on a portion

of the mortgage payment, then, for your house?
A.

Yeah, she's helped out more than her fair

Q.

Now so I understand this, are you, yourself --

share.

you're out the $892, including the fee for Western
Union?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And do you still owe this loan to this friend

of yours who originally loaned you the money?
A.

Yeah, I do.
MS. BEATON:

I don't think I have any further

questions.

CROSS

EXAMINATION

BY MR. GRAVIS:
Q.

Now, when you contacted Western Union didn't

they tell you that if you filed a police report they
would cover the fraud?
A.

They actually had told me originally they

thought they would be able to do -- they shouldn't have
given me a -- or given a refund check out, that they
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MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

I have no further questions,
Would you like me -And move for what's been marked

as State's Exhibit 5 be admitted.

And I'd move for

admission also of State's Exhibit No. 6.
MR. GRAVIS:

May we approach the bench, Your

Honor?
THE COURT:

Yes.

(Whereupon, a side-bar conference was held.)
MS. BEATON:

Okay.

And just for the record,

at this point, this Exhibit No. 6 (Inaudible) 5, 1, 2, 3
and 4 have been admitted.
(State's Exhibit No. 6 received into
evidence.)
Q.

BY MS. BEATON:

Detective Reaves, there was a

question that came in from the jury that indicates, "If
a forgery was involved, why didn't Detective Reaves"
it says

—

(Inaudible) but it's Reaves -- "question the

Western Union signature?"
So why didn't you question the defendant

about

the signature on the Western Union form?
A.
question.

I'm not sure which signature would be in
I'm not understanding the question.

There's

so many forms on that I'm not sure which one would be...
Q.

In this particular case, Tom Moore's name is
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signed on three different -- in three different areas.
A.

Okay.

Q.

You talked to him a little bit about the

question when they're sending the money, there's a
reference, and the defendant claims he had permission
from Tom to sign that.
A.

Okay.

Q.

And we've talked about that.

There is also a

signature that you talked about on the check itself in
order to get the refund.
A.

That's correct.

Q.

You talked to the defendant about that.

believe the question is:

I

Why didn't you talk to the

defendant about this -- this signature right here, that
was filled out in conjunction with the refund form from
Western Union?
A.

You know, I believe that you actually did ask

me something about that.

I can't honestly sit here and

testify that I didn't put it in the statement I had with
Mr. Manchester and it's not in my case

(Inaudible).

And

because of the time length, I cannot tell you that I
specifically asked him about that or not, and I don't
want to give the wrong impression either way.

And so I

hope that answers the question.
Q.

Is your answer, then, you did not discuss with
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him what's been marked as State's Exhibit 2, that
particular
A.

signature?
What my answer is, I could not honestly -- I

would assume that I would have, but when I go down to
the specific questioning and the answering, I did not
put it in here.

Most likely, as I would do in every

case, did you do this, did you do this, did you do this,
(Inaudible) down there, I did not bring it to this
statement about that particular signature.
Q.

Is there any reason why you

State's Exhibit No. 4
A.

(Inaudible) marked

(Inaudible)?

Well, because the way I view this here, this

is the transaction that actually made the theft, that
actually made the forgery itself.

In other words, if it

wasn't for this signature here in the back and here, Mr.
Manchester would not have received the $825.
signing

By simply

(Inaudible) the fees does not necessarily

him the money.

give

This is the actual money transaction,

which is the actual check which is issued out to Mr.
Moore and Mr. Moore's signature is not -- the proper
signature is not on here and that's the one that he was
admitting to.
Q.

Okay.

A.

So that was probably a lower thing or -- to

me, maybe I didn't understand it correctly, but that
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tied in ex^^tly to -- that created a refund where this
is actually the one that created the refund.
Q.

The check itself?

A.

The check itself, yes.

Q.

Okay.
MS. BEATON:

I don't have any further

questions of this witness.
THE COURT:

Will both the lawyers approach for

just a minute, please.
(Whereupon, a side-bar conference was held.)
THE COURT:

Members of the jury, one of your

members passed the Court a note with this question:
"How did Steven Manchester manage to cash the check
without Tom Moore's identification?"
The testimony was that this check could be
cashed with one of two ways, either with an
identification or having the original receipt that had
the test question.

And the evidence is that he used

the -MR. GRAVIS:
check

Let the person who cashed the

(Inaudible) .
THE COURT:

That's right.

The person who had

the -- who cashed the check had the original

receipt

with the test question.
MS. BEATON:

With that, I'm done questioning
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